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KOLBE V. HOGAN: HEWING TO HELLER AND  
TAKING AIM AT A STANDARD OF STRICT SCRUTINY  
FOR COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS LEGISLATION 
BRETT S. TURLINGTON 
In Kolbe v. Hogan,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit considered whether Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act2 infringes upon 
the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.3  The Fourth 
Circuit held that the Firearm Safety Act’s assault weapon and large-capacity 
magazine bans implicate the protections guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment, and therefore these bans should be analyzed under a standard 
of strict scrutiny.4  The court reached the correct conclusion in this case, in 
part because it properly construed the “dangerous and unusual” language 
from District of Columbia v. Heller5 that had been either misunderstood or 
misapplied by other courts.6  Heller limited the right to keep and bear arms 
to weapons “in common use at the time,” as supported by the historical 
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 1.  813 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(mem). 
 2.  Firearm Safety Act, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 4-301 to 4-306 (West Supp. 2015); 
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-101 (West Supp. 2015); see Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168–70 
(providing background information on the Firearm Safety Act). 
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 4.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168.  See infra notes 123–129 and accompanying text (providing an 
explanation of constitutional levels of scrutiny). 
 5.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
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tradition of banning dangerous and unusual weapons.7  As explained in 
Kolbe, Heller did not intend the “dangerous and unusual” language to act as 
an independent limitation on the right to keep and bear arms, despite recent 
decisions from other circuits.8  Furthermore, the court reached the correct 
judgment because it reasoned that sweeping assault weapon and large-
capacity magazine bans, like the Firearm Safety Act, demand strict 
scrutiny.9  Such bans indiscriminately interfere with the core lawful purpose 
of the Second Amendment, namely protecting the possession of firearms for 
self-defense within the home.10  Other United States courts of appeals have 
applied intermediate scrutiny to similar laws, which means Kolbe created a 
circuit split.11  The cogent and compelling reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in 
favor of applying strict scrutiny to broad firearm bans might produce 
similar decisions in other circuits and, ultimately, spur the Supreme Court 
of the United States to resolve the circuit split.12  On remand, if the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland applies strict scrutiny and 
finds the Firearm Safety Act unconstitutional, state legislatures within the 
Fourth Circuit will need to carefully craft future firearms legislation to 
afford greater protection to the right to keep and bear arms.13 
I.  THE CASE 
On May 16, 2013, the Governor of Maryland, Martin O’Malley, 
signed into law the Firearm Safety Act.14  The Maryland General Assembly 
passed the Firearm Safety Act in response to a series of mass shootings in 
                                                          
 7.  554 U.S. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)); see also 
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027–28 (2016) (per curiam) (explaining that Heller’s 
“common use at the time” limitation does not merely refer to arms in existence at time of the 
founding, but more properly refers to all bearable arms, including newer weapons such as electric 
stun guns). 
 8.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
9.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 179–80 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. 
App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem); see infra Part IV.B. 
 10.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d at 179–80. 
 11.  See infra notes 301–305 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 13.  See infra Part IV.B.  The Fourth Circuit originally remanded the case to the district court 
to apply strict scrutiny to the Firearm Safety Act.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d at 192.  
Subsequently, the State requested a rehearing en banc.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (mem).  The Fourth Circuit granted the State’s petition for a rehearing en banc and 
heard oral arguments on May 11, 2016.  Id.  The court is expected to issue an opinion in 2017.  
See, e.g., John Haughey, Top 10 Most Important Gun Rights Cases of 2016, OUTDOORLIFE (Dec. 
28, 2016), http://www.outdoorlife.com/top-most-important-10-gun-related-court-cases-2016.  
 14.  See generally Firearm Safety Act, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 4-301–4-306 (West 
Supp. 2015) (providing the main text of the Firearm Safety Act); PUB. SAFETY § 5-101 (defining 
an “assault long gun” and a “licensed firearms dealer” for the purposes of the Firearm Safety Act); 
Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768, 774 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. 
Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 
2016) (mem). 
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other states, most notably the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 
Newtown, Connecticut.15  Key provisions within the act prohibited citizens 
from possessing, selling, purchasing, or transferring enumerated assault 
weapons and their copies, as well as large-capacity magazines.16  
Possession or any other violation of the ban after October 1, 2013, 
constituted a misdemeanor punishable by up to three years in prison.17  The 
large-capacity magazine ban applied to magazines with a capacity of more 
than ten rounds of ammunition and was virtually identical to the assault 
weapon ban.18 
The Firearm Safety Act criminalized the conduct and desired conduct 
of numerous Maryland citizens and organizations.19  Named plaintiff 
Stephen Kolbe owned a semi-automatic handgun banned by the Act and 
would have purchased another semi-automatic firearm and several large-
capacity magazines if not for the Firearm Safety Act.20  Plaintiff Andrew 
Turner also owned a semi-automatic firearm banned by the Act and wanted 
to purchase a semi-automatic rifle and more large-capacity magazines.21  
Plaintiffs Wink’s Sporting Goods, Inc. and Atlantic Guns, Inc. relied on the 
sale of firearms and magazines to support their respective businesses.22  A 
number of trade, hunting, and gun-owners’ rights organizations also joined 
in filing the complaint because they felt their rights and their members’ 
rights were restricted by the Firearm Safety Act.23 
                                                          
 15.  Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 774.  In the Sandy Hook shooting, the gunman used 
an assault rifle to claim the lives of twenty children and six adults.  Id.; see also Connecticut 
Shootings Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 19, 2016, 4:11 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/07/us/connecticut-shootings-fast-facts/ (stating that the Sandy Hook 
shooter used a semi-automatic Bushmaster rifle). 
 16.  Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 775–76 (citing CRIM. LAW §§ 4-303(a), 4-305(b)).  
The assault weapon ban applied to over forty-five types of assault long guns, including many 
semi-automatic rifles.  Id. at 775–76, 775 n.7 (citing CRIM. LAW § 4-301(b); PUB. SAFETY § 5-
101(r)(2)).  The term “semi-automatic” refers to firearms that require the shooter to pull the 
trigger for each round of ammunition she wishes to expel, as opposed to automatic firearms, 
which continuously expel ammunition as long as the trigger is depressed.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 
F.3d at 168 n.1.  Narrow exceptions to the assault weapon ban granted limited ownership rights to 
groups such as law enforcement officers.  Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (citing CRIM. 
LAW § 4-302(7)).  
 17.  Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (citing CRIM. LAW § 4-306(a)). 
 18.  Id. (citing CRIM. LAW § 4-305(b)).  Unlike the provisions prohibiting assault weapons, 
however, the law did not prohibit the “mere possession” of large-capacity magazines or the 
transportation of large-capacity magazines into Maryland from outside the state.  See id. at 776 & 
n.9 (citing CRIM. LAW § 4-305). 
 19.  See, e.g., Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 774 n.3 (determining that individual, gun-
owning citizens faced a “credible threat” of prosecution under the Firearm Safety Act). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 774 & n.3. 
 22.  Id. at 774 & n.1. 
 23.  Id.  The complete list of plaintiffs in this case is: Mr. Kolbe; Mr. Turner; Wink’s Sporting 
Goods, Inc.; Atlantic Guns, Inc.; Associated Gun Clubs of Baltimore, Inc.; Maryland Shall Issue, 
Inc.; Maryland State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc.; National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc.; 
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On September 26, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the 
State in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, 
challenging the Firearm Safety Act’s constitutionality.24  The next day, the 
plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order.25  
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the Firearm Safety Act violated their 
rights under the Second Amendment, violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,26 and was void for vagueness.27  The district 
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, and the 
parties agreed that the court should proceed to consider the matter on the 
merits as opposed to the request for preliminary injunction alone.28  
Subsequently, the plaintiffs and the State filed cross motions for summary 
judgment.29  On August 22, 2014, the district court held that the Firearm 
Safety Act was constitutional and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the State.30 
In the first part of its decision, the district court addressed the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the Second Amendment protected their right to keep 
and bear the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines banned by the 
Firearm Safety Act.31  The district court was “inclined to find” that assault 
weapons and large-capacity magazines fall outside the scope of Second 
Amendment protection because they were not considered weapons 
“commonly possessed for lawful purposes,” including self-defense.32  
Despite this inclination, the court abstained from resolving this issue and 
assumed that the Firearm Safety Act burdened the plaintiffs’ Second 
Amendment right.33  The court proceeded to the next step of its Second 
Amendment analysis and determined that intermediate scrutiny should 
                                                          
and Maryland Licensed Firearms Dealers Association, Inc.  Id. at 774.  The State includes the 
Governor, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department of State Police and 
Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, and the Maryland State Police.  The plaintiffs sued 
all the defendants in their official capacities.  Id. at 774 n.2. 
 24.  Id. at 776.   
 25.  Id. 
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 27.  Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 776–77. 
 28.  Id. at 776. 
 29.  Id. at 774–75. 
 30.  Id. at 803. 
 31.  Id. at 782. 
 32.  Id. at 788.  The court noted that assault weapons represent no more than three percent of 
the current civilian gun stock, and ownership of those weapons is highly concentrated in less than 
one percent of the U.S. population.  Id.  The court also highlighted the fact that assault weapons 
are used at a disproportionate rate in mass shootings and murders of law enforcement officers as 
compared to their ownership levels in the general public.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 789.  Other courts have assumed Second Amendment infringement in order to 
reach the second step of the analysis.  Id. (citing Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875–76 
(4th Cir. 2013); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1260–61 (D.C. Cir. 
2011)).  
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apply to the Firearm Safety Act.34  The court noted that the act only affected 
assault weapon ownership and did not affect ownership of a handgun or any 
other type of weapon for the purpose of self-defense.35  Thus, the court 
reasoned that the act did not unduly burden the core right under the Second 
Amendment: self-defense within the home.36  Lastly, the district court held 
that the Firearm Safety Act survived intermediate scrutiny because it 
furthers Maryland’s dual interests of protecting public safety and reducing 
crime.37  
The plaintiffs also argued that the Firearm Safety Act violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by containing 
exceptions allowing former law enforcement officers to possess the 
weapons and magazines banned to others.38  The court denied the plaintiffs’ 
Equal Protection claim, holding that Maryland was not treating similarly-
situated persons differently by allowing retired law enforcement officers to 
own assault weapons and large-capacity magazines while denying that same 
right to the general public.39 
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that two specific uses of the word “copy” 
rendered the Firearm Safety Act void for vagueness because a reasonable 
person could not discern what constitutes a “copy” of the banned assault 
weapons.40  The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge, 
holding that the word “copy” was not unconstitutionally vague.41  The 
                                                          
 34.  Id. at 790. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 792–97. 
 38.  Id. at 797. 
 39.  Id. at 799.  The court emphasized retired law enforcement officers’ extensive training and 
experiences ensuring public safety as evidence that they are not similar to the general public in all 
relevant respects.  Id. at 798–99. 
 40.  Id. at 799.  The Firearm Safety Act contains the word “copy” three times.  MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-301(d)(3) (West Supp. 2015); PUB. SAFETY § 5-101(r)(2); CRIM. LAW § 4-
301(c). 
 41.  Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 803.  The court noted that the term “copies” had 
been a part of Maryland firearms law for over twenty years, yet no arrest or conviction resulting 
from a misunderstanding of the term occurred during that time period.  Id. at 802.  The court also 
explained that the Maryland Attorney General and the Maryland State Police have issued opinions 
on what constitutes a copy and offering to answer any further questions that citizens might have.  
Id. at 801–02 (citing Regulated Firearms—Assault Weapons—Whether a Weapon is a “Copy” of 
a Designated Assault Weapon and Therefore Subject to the Regulated Firearms Law, 95 Md. Op. 
Att’y Gen. 101 (2010) (explaining that a copy of a designated assault weapon has similar 
components and function to that weapon, not a mere cosmetic similarity); MARYLAND STATE 
POLICE, FIREARMS BULLETIN #10-2, INFORMATION ON ASSAULT WEAPONS PURCHASES (2010), 
http://mdsp.maryland.gov/Document%20Downloads/FIREARMS%20BULLETIN%2010-2.pdf 
(providing information about what the Maryland State Police consider a copy of an enumerated 
assault weapon)). 
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plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit.42 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
For over two centuries, the Constitution of the United States, through 
the Second Amendment, has preserved the right to keep and bear arms.43  
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century and continuing into the 
twenty-first century, courts almost universally recognized that the Second 
Amendment protects the collective right of the militia to keep and bear arms 
and does not protect an individual right.44  Yet, within the past decade, the 
United States Supreme Court’s conception of the right to keep and bear 
arms changed drastically when the Court held that the Second Amendment 
confers an individual right to keep and bear arms and applies to the 
individual states.45  Section II.A recites a brief history of the Second 
Amendment and its historical understanding dating back to the founding of 
the United States of America.  Section II.B discusses how the holdings in 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago46 altered Second Amendment 
jurisprudence by recognizing an individual right to keep and bear arms and 
how courts examine contemporary firearms legislation in light of those 
holdings.  Finally, Section II.C examines the central issue that courts have 
grappled with since Heller and McDonald—the correct standard of 
scrutiny—and the growing trend among courts towards applying 
intermediate scrutiny.  
                                                          
 42.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 
880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem). 
 43.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 44.  See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to the 
collective rights view as the “dominant view of the Second Amendment . . . widely accepted by 
the federal courts . . . .”); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir. 2000) (“It is well-
established that the Second Amendment does not create an individual right.”); Love v. Pepersack, 
47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Since [1939], lower federal courts have uniformly held that the 
Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right.”); Eckert v. City of 
Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610, 610 (3d Cir. 1973) (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms is not a right 
given by the United States Constitution.”); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1968) (“As the 
language of the amendment itself indicates it was not framed with individual rights in mind. Thus 
it refers to the collective right ‘of the people’ to keep and bear arms in connection with ‘a well-
regulated militia.’”).  There are many other cases reiterating this principle.  But see United States 
v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221–27 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing an individual right to keep and 
bear arms, although “mindful that almost all of our sister circuits have rejected any individual 
rights view of the Second Amendment”). 
 45.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There seems to us no 
doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right to keep and bear arms.”); see also infra Part II.B (explaining the significance of the Heller 
and McDonald decisions). 
 46.  561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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A.  The Great Debate: The Struggle Between Viewing the Second 
Amendment as an Individual Right or a Collective Right in the 
Years Prior to Heller 
The Second Amendment declares, “[a] well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”47  The first half of the Second 
Amendment, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free state,” is the prefatory clause, which provides the law’s purpose.48  The 
second half of the Amendment, from “the right of the people” onward, is 
the operative clause, which gives a command.49  In the decades prior to 
Heller, individual right theorists and collective right theorists clashed over 
the relationship between these two clauses.50  Individual right theorists 
believe the Second Amendment guarantees a personal right to keep and 
bear arms; thus, the prefatory clause does not affect the operative clause.51  
Collective right theorists believe the Second Amendment provides a right to 
keep and bear arms “in connection with service in the state militia”; thus, 
the prefatory clause modifies the operative clause and defines Second 
Amendment rights.52 
The debate between individual and collective right theorists predates 
the Second Amendment’s ratification.53  Discussions at the Constitutional 
Convention,54 among early colonial and state legislators,55 and in eighteenth 
century legal commentary56 demonstrate that many citizens, including some 
Founders, understood the Second Amendment as protecting only the 
                                                          
 47.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 48.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 577, 595. 
 49.  Id. at 577 (referring to the relationship between the prefatory and operative clause and 
stating that there must exist “a link between the stated purpose and the command”). 
 50.  See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 674–75, 675 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(discussing the debate between individual and collective right theorists). 
 51.  Id. at 675 n.2 (citing Kenneth A. Klukowski, Armed by Right: The Emerging 
Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 167, 180–81 (2008)). 
 52.  Id. at 674–75.  Because the Justices conducted thorough historical research, much of this 
discussion of early understandings of the Second Amendment is informed by the opinions in 
Heller and McDonald.  This reflects both the importance of those opinions and the lack of Second 
Amendment decisions for approximately seventy years prior to Heller.  See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority “disregard[s] a unanimous opinion of 
this Court, upon which substantial reliance has been placed by legislators and citizens for nearly 
70 years.”). 
 53.  Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768 (2010) (determining that the 
right to keep and bear arms for the personal goal of self-defense was “fundamental” to those who 
drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights), with United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) 
(asserting that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to support the militia established by the 
Constitution). 
 54.  Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. 
 55.  Id. at 179–81 (providing examples of legislation from Massachusetts, New York, 
Virginia instituting gun laws for military purposes). 
 56.  Id. at 179. 
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collective right to bear arms for service in the militia.57  A number of state 
ratification conventions, for example, proposed different versions of the 
Second Amendment that emphasized the importance of protecting military 
interests, not individual interests.58  Nevertheless, other sources of legal 
commentary59 and deliberations prior to the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights60 assumed that the right to keep and bear arms was individual and 
fundamental.61  State constitutions, enacted before or immediately 
following ratification, commonly included a right of citizens to bear arms in 
defense of themselves and the state, protecting both an individual and 
collective right.62 
In the period between the ratification of the Second Amendment and 
the Civil War, courts and prominent legal scholars continued to espouse a 
variety of views on whether the amendment protected an individual or 
collective right to bear arms.63  In Houston v. Moore,64 Justice Story 
discussed the power of states to organize and arm the militia, but suggested 
that the Second Amendment “may not . . . have any important bearing on 
this point.”65  In Johnson v. Tompkins,66 Justice Baldwin posited that a 
citizen “had a right to carry arms in defence of his property or person.”67  
Justice Story and Justice Baldwin’s assertions are two post-ratification 
examples of an individual rights understanding of the Second 
Amendment.68  Several state courts69 and legal commentators70 also adopted 
                                                          
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 655 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  But 
see id. at 603 (majority opinion) (“That concern found expression, however, not in the various 
Second Amendment precursors proposed in the state conventions, but in separate structural 
provisions that would have given the States concurrent and seemingly non-pre-emptible authority 
to organize, discipline, and arm the militia when the Federal Government failed to do so.”). 
 59.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768 (2010) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 
594). 
 60.  Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598). 
 61.  Id. at 769. 
 62.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 600–02. 
 63.  See infra notes 64–71 and accompanying text (providing cases and commentary 
supporting the individual rights view).  But see infra notes 72–73 (providing cases and 
commentary demonstrating the collective rights view). 
 64.  18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
 65.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 610 (quoting Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 52–53 (Story, J., 
dissenting)).  The quoted passage from Justice Story actually refers to the Fifth Amendment, but it 
can be safely assumed that reference was a typographical error because Justice Story quotes the 
entire substance of the Second Amendment in the same sentence.  See id. (“The fifth amendment 
to the constitution, declaring that ‘a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,’ may not, perhaps, be 
thought to have any important bearing on this point.”). 
 66.  13 F. Cas. 840 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416). 
 67.  Id. at 852. 
 68.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 610–11. 
 69.  E.g., Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 
(1850); Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356, 360 (1833).  
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the individual rights view, often by declaring that the right to keep and bear 
arms was calculated to allow for self-defense, the traditional point of 
emphasis for individual right supporters.71  Conversely, collective right 
theorists point to other state court decisions from the post-ratification period 
that emphasize the right to bear arms in connection with military service.72  
Collective right theorists acknowledge Justice Story’s opinion in Moore, 
but claim that his commentary on the Constitution more accurately portrays 
his view that a well-regulated militia is “the natural defence of a free 
country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and 
domestic usurpations of power by rulers.”73 
The debate between individual rights theorists and collective rights 
theorists arose again after the Civil War.74  Notably, the 39th Congress’ 
decision to disband Southern militias, but not to disarm their members, was 
seen as an individual rights endorsement.75  Furthermore, the courts during 
this time period recognized that the Second Amendment limited the power 
of the federal government, not the power of the states.76 
In 1939, the Supreme Court appeared to adopt a collective right view.  
In United States v. Miller,77 the Court upheld the application of the National 
Firearms Act78 to short-barrel shotguns shipped in interstate commerce.79  
Namely, the Court determined that the Second Amendment was created 
with “obvious purpose” to assure the continuation and effectiveness of the 
militia.80  The Second Amendment did not secure the right to possess short-
barrel shotguns because the shotguns were not part of “ordinary military 
equipment” and could not “contribute to the common defense.”81  After 
Miller, and until Heller almost seventy years later, the Supreme Court did 
not recognize any non-militia-related interests under the Second 
                                                          
 70.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 605–10 (discussing nineteenth century scholars Rawle, Story and 
Blackstone, who endorsed the individual right view of the Second Amendment).  
 71.  See id. at 599 (adopting the individual right view and expressing that self-defense is the 
“central component” of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms). 
 72.  E.g., Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840). 
 73.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 667–68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1897, at 620–21 (4th ed. 1873) 
(footnote omitted)). 
 74.  Id. at 614 (majority opinion). 
 75.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 772–73 (2010). 
 76.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 674–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally McDonald, 561 U.S. at 
754 (2010) (explaining that the Bill of Rights originally only applied against the federal 
government). 
 77.  307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 78.  I.R.C. §§ 5801–5872 (West 2016) (original version at Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 
(1934)). 
 79.  Miller, 307 U.S. at 177, 183. 
 80.  Id. at 178. 
 81.  Id. 
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Amendment.82  Lower courts, following what was perceived as a well-
settled rule, consistently held that the Second Amendment protected a 
collective right, rather than an individual right to keep and bear arms.83 
B.  Come Heller High Water: The Supreme Court Settles the Debate 
and Provides the Analytical Framework for Lower Courts 
Two landmark cases, decided two years and two days apart, 
dramatically changed the interpretation and application of the Second 
Amendment.84  In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court 
announced that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to 
keep and bear arms.85  The Court also established a new test for evaluating 
Second Amendment challenges, whereby courts must consider first whether 
the challenged law burdens an individual’s right to possess and use firearms 
for traditionally lawful purposes and, if the law does burden an individual’s 
right, the court must subsequently analyze that law under an appropriate 
standard of heightened scrutiny.86  In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the 
Supreme Court incorporated the Second Amendment through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that states recognize an individual’s right 
to keep and bear arms.87  
The respondent in Heller, Dick Heller, carried a handgun while on 
duty as a District of Columbia special police officer.88  Mr. Heller applied 
for a registration certificate in order to keep a handgun at his home, but the 
District of Columbia denied his application.89  The respondent and five 
other D.C. residents filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing three of its laws 
restricting private handgun ownership and use.90  The challenged District of 
Columbia laws banned handgun registration, required firearms in the home 
                                                          
 82.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 900 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 
also supra note 44.  
 83.  See supra note 44. 
 84.  See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 253–54 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(referring to Heller as “the seminal decision” and McDonald as “a landmark case”); United States 
v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (describing Heller and McDonald as “landmark 
decisions”). 
 85.  554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
 86.  Id. at 626–29; see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 254 (“This two-step 
rubric flows from the dictates of Heller and McDonald . . . .”). 
 87.  561 U.S. at 750 (majority opinion).  A majority of the Court held that the Second 
Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, but the majority splintered on 
exactly which section permitted incorporation, producing a plurality opinion on this specific issue.  
See id. at 748–49 (revealing the split with respect to various sections of the opinion); id. at 805–06 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (urging the Court to incorporate the Second Amendment through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
 88.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 575. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at 575–76; see infra note 91 (providing the three laws in question). 
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to remain inoperable, and imposed a licensing requirement for carrying a 
handgun.91  The district court dismissed the complaint, and the respondent 
appealed.92  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
reversed the district court’s ruling on Second Amendment grounds and 
directed the district court to enter summary judgment for the respondent.93  
The District of Columbia appealed, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.94 
First, the Supreme Court analyzed the language and history of the 
Second Amendment.95  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, examined 
the meaning of the prefatory and operative clauses at the time of the Second 
Amendment’s enactment.96  The Court also discussed the way early colonial 
legislation, state constitutions, case law, and commentaries viewed the right 
to keep and bear arms.97  Ultimately, the Court championed the individual 
right view and stated that the Second Amendment “elevates above all other 
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.”98  Despite recognizing an individual right, the 
Court carefully circumscribed it.  Justice Scalia provided an informative, 
not exhaustive, list of statutes that impede the right to keep and bear arms 
but remain presumptively lawful.99  Additionally, the Court identified two 
constraints, first recognized in Miller, on the types of weapons protected 
under the Second Amendment.100  Weapons must be “typically possessed 
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” and “in common use at the 
time.”101  The Court explained that the “in common use at the time” 
limitation, which first appeared in Miller, was fairly supported by the 
custom of denying “dangerous and unusual weapons” protection under the 
Second Amendment.102 
                                                          
 91.  See generally D.C. CODE §§ 7-2.501(12), 7-2502.01(a) (2001); D.C. CODE §§ 7-
2502.02(a)(4), 7-2507.02 (2001), invalidated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
 92.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 576. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 576–600 (defining and examining the prefatory and operative clauses of the Second 
Amendment). 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id. at 600–26; see also supra notes 53–76. 
 98.  Id. at 635; see also id. at 628 (noting that “the inherent right of self-defense has been 
central to the Second Amendment right”). 
 99.  Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26.  He stated:  
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools or government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 
Id. at 626–27 (footnote omitted).  
 100.  Id. at 624–25. 
 101.  Id. (first citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); then quoting id. at 179)). 
 102.  Id. at 627. 
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Finally, the Supreme Court examined the three District of Columbia 
laws.103  The Court held that two of the laws failed under both standards of 
scrutiny applicable to fundamental rights, but notably declined to 
recommend a specific level of scrutiny for the Second Amendment analysis, 
despite Justice Breyer’s admonition in his dissent.104  The Court, however, 
disqualified rational basis review and sharply criticized Breyer’s proposal, 
the interest-balancing approach.105  The Court did not address the 
constitutionality of the District’s third law, the licensing requirement, and 
assumed that the requirement would not interfere with the respondent’s 
requested relief.106 
Two years after deciding Heller, the Supreme Court expanded Heller’s 
reach in the landmark decision of McDonald v. Chicago.  In McDonald, 
Otis McDonald and three other Chicago residents wanted to keep handguns 
in their homes for the purpose of self-defense.107  Mr. McDonald, a 
community activist, received threats because of his efforts to introduce 
alternative policing strategies in his community.108  Likewise, the other 
petitioners were subjected to threats and violence.109  One Chicago 
ordinance required residents to obtain a registration certificate in order to 
possess a firearm, but another ordinance prohibited the registration of most 
handguns.110  Oak Park, a town in the Chicago suburbs, had a similar 
ordinance that entirely prohibited all firearms.111 
The McDonald Court held that the Second Amendment is applicable 
against the states and, therefore, remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to 
                                                          
 103.  Id. at 628–31.  
 104.  Id. at 628–31, 634; id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the standard 
“matters” for future Second Amendment cases); see also infra notes 123–129 and accompanying 
text discussing standards of scrutiny.  
 105.  Id. at 628 n.27 (majority opinion) (explaining that rational basis scrutiny “could not be 
used” to evaluate legislation that attempts to burden a specific, enumerated right); id. at 634–35 
(“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected 
to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”).  Justice Breyer acknowledged that the writers of 
the Second Amendment sought to protect the right of citizens to possess and use arms in self-
defense.  Id. at 682 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  However, Justice Breyer also identified several 
interests a legislature might have in limiting citizen access to firearms: saving lives, preventing 
injury, and reducing crime.  Id.  Recognition of these competing interests colored Justice Breyer’s 
interest-balancing approach, which was intended to find the middle ground between rational basis 
review, which presumes a gun regulation’s constitutionality, and strict scrutiny, which presumes a 
gun regulation’s unconstitutionality.  Id. at 689.  This approach is designed to mirror inquiries the 
Court conducted in other contexts, such as election law cases, and defer to the legislature in 
instances where lawmakers are likely to have greater expertise and fact-finding ability.  Id. at 690. 
 106.  Id. at 630–31. 
 107.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). 
 108.  Id. at 751. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 750 (quoting CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c) (2009); 
OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE § 27-1-1 (2009)). 
 111.  Id. (quoting OAK PARK, ILL. VILLAGE CODE § 27-2-1 (2007)). 
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determine if the relevant city ordinances impeding and prohibiting handgun 
possession violated the Second Amendment.112  The Court reiterated that 
the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is the “central component” 
of the Second Amendment and found that right to be “necessary to our 
system of ordered liberty.”113  Thus, the Court’s incorporation doctrine 
counseled that the right to keep and bear arms was fully applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.114  After incorporating the 
Second Amendment, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and 
remanded to allow the court of appeals to consider whether the pertinent 
laws unconstitutionally restricted the right to keep and bear arms.115 
The Court declared in Heller and McDonald that the Second 
Amendment protects a private, individual right to possess and use firearms 
for traditionally lawful purposes, especially self-defense within the home.116  
The test Heller sets forth is, first, a court must consider whether the 
challenged law burdens an individual’s Second Amendment rights by 
prohibiting conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment 
through two inquiries.117  This inquiry often requires a court to consider the 
list of presumptively lawful statutes provided in Heller.118  If the regulation 
prohibits a specific type of weapon, a court must consider whether law-
abiding citizens typically possess that weapon for lawful purposes and 
whether the weapon is “in common use at the time.”119  Second, if a court 
                                                          
 112.  Id. at 791.  Justice Alito, writing for the majority on this issue, explored the history of the 
Bill of Rights with respect to incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 753–59.  
The Court traced the path from Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), a landmark case that 
rejected the Bill of Rights’ applicability to the states, to the modern doctrine of selective 
incorporation, which has incorporated almost all of the provisions in the Bill of Rights to the 
states.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 754; id. at 763 (explaining that selective incorporation uses the 
Due Process Clause to incorporate “particular rights contained within the first eight 
Amendments”).  Since Heller implicated federal law and no Supreme Court opinion to date had 
addressed incorporation of the Second Amendment, some lower courts had concluded that the 
Second Amendment did not apply to the states.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 752 (citing NRA, Inc. v. 
Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (noting that the district court refused to apply 
the Second Amendment against the states because Heller “did not opine” on the subject of 
incorporation)). 
 113.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 
(2008)); id. at 778. 
 114.  Id. at 750.  Justice Thomas wrote separately to argue that the Second Amendment should 
be incorporated through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather 
than the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 800 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 115.  Id. at 791. 
 116.  E.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the 
decisions in Heller and McDonald established a “clearly-defined fundamental right” to have 
firearms in the home for the purpose of self-defense). 
 117. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“Guided by the teachings of the Supreme Court, our own jurisprudence, and the examples 
provided by our sister circuits, we adopt a two-step analytical framework . . . .”). 
 118.  See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 119. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n., 804 F.3d at 255. 
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determines that the law in question indeed burdens an individual’s Second 
Amendment rights through either of these tests, it must apply heightened 
scrutiny to the law in question.120 
Arguably, the tandem of Heller and McDonald transformed the right 
to keep and bear arms more profoundly than any other event since the 
enactment of the Second Amendment.  Heller declared that the Second 
Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms, and 
McDonald secured that right for the citizens of the various states.121  
Furthermore, Heller and McDonald dramatically altered the approach that 
lower courts use for legislation challenged under the Second 
Amendment.122 
C.  Under Scrutiny: The Standards of Scrutiny After Heller and 
McDonald and the Growing Preference for Intermediate Scrutiny 
When considering cases concerning alleged violations of constitutional 
rights, the Supreme Court employs different standards of judicial review 
known as levels or standards of scrutiny.123  Strict scrutiny, the most 
exacting of the Court’s standards, is applied to laws that limit the exercise 
of a fundamental right.124  In order to overcome strict scrutiny, a statute 
must promote a compelling governmental interest, and the government 
must narrowly tailor the statute in question in order to achieve that 
interest.125  Rational basis review, the most deferential of the Court’s 
standards, is used for legislation that does not significantly interfere with a 
fundamental right.126  Under rational basis scrutiny, a statute rationally in 
furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose is constitutional.127  
Finally, the Court utilizes a third level of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, for 
                                                          
 120. Id. at 254. 
 121.  See supra notes 98, 112 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See supra notes 116–120 and accompanying text. 
 123.  Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (referring to the “standards 
of scrutiny” the Court applies).  The levels of scrutiny are also, of course, applied in the context of 
an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but this Note discusses their application to an alleged violation of one of the rights 
expressed in the Bill of Rights. 
 124.  Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); United 
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for 
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within 
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments . . . .” (citing 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 
(1938)). 
 125.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a statute using racial classifications). 
 126.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a 
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long 
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”). 
 127.  Id. 
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laws that either implicate important, non-fundamental interests or do not 
impose a severe burden on a fundamental right.128  A statute will survive 
intermediate scrutiny if it is substantially related to the achievement of an 
important governmental objective.129 
In Heller, the Supreme Court eliminated rational basis review as a 
viable standard of scrutiny for alleged violations of the Second 
Amendment, but the Court did not provide, and has not provided since, any 
further guidance in regard to the proper standard.130  Therefore, courts have 
applied a range of standards of scrutiny to laws challenged under the 
Second Amendment.131  The following Sections explain these different 
kinds of scrutiny as they have been applied in the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and other Circuits, respectively. 
1.  The Fourth Circuit’s First Amendment Framework Leads to the 
Application of Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a blueprint for lower 
courts to use when analyzing post-Heller Second Amendment challenges in 
United States v. Chester.132  In Chester, the challenged law prevented 
domestic violence misdemeanants from obtaining firearms.133  Applying the 
first step from the Heller analysis, the court concluded that the defendant’s 
Second Amendment rights remained intact following his domestic violence 
conviction.134  The court noted that laws disarming felons were 
presumptively valid under Heller, but determined that there was “a lack of 
historical evidence” concerning disarming misdemeanants.135  The court 
then turned to the level of scrutiny applicable to a law that burdens conduct 
protected under the Second Amendment.136  During this part of its analysis, 
the Fourth Circuit explained that the First Amendment could serve as a 
                                                          
 128.  See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
562–63 (1980) (establishing that, although the First Amendment protects commercial speech, 
there is a “‘commonsense’ distinction” between commercial speech and private speech, which is 
at the core of the First Amendment right to free speech (quoting Ohralik v. Oh. State Bar Ass’n, 
436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)). 
 129.  Id. at 566. 
 130.  See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) (“So far, however, the Justices have declined to specify how much 
substantive review the Second Amendment requires.”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 
642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (referring to the decision of which level of scrutiny to apply as a 
“quagmire”). 
 131.  See infra Parts II.C.1–2. 
 132.  628 F.3d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[We] . . . reissue our decision to provide district 
courts in this Circuit guidance on the framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges.”). 
 133.  Id.; see generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9) (West 2016). 
 134.  Chester, 628 F.3d at 681–82. 
 135.  Id. at 681. 
 136.  Id. at 682. 
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“guide” since Heller had neglected to provide a specific standard of 
scrutiny.137  In cases that assert a violation of the right to free speech as 
protected under the First Amendment, the court looks at two factors to 
determine the applicable standard of scrutiny: the nature of the conduct 
being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the 
right.138  Private speech subject to content-specific regulations would be 
examined under strict scrutiny, but commercial speech or speech subject to 
content-neutral regulations would be afforded greater deference by the 
court.139  In Chester, the Fourth Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny was 
appropriate because the defendant was not a “law-abiding, responsible” 
citizen seeking to exercise his rights under the Second Amendment, so the 
burden of the law was light.140 
One year later, in United States v. Masciandaro,141 the Fourth Circuit 
addressed a Second Amendment challenge to a federal statute that 
prohibited possessing a handgun in a national park.142  The defendant in 
Masciandaro was asleep in his car within the national park area when he 
was arrested for having a gun in his vehicle.143  Because the defendant 
frequently slept in his car while traveling for business, he argued that Heller 
gave him a right to possess a handgun for the purpose of self-defense.144  
The Fourth Circuit applied its First Amendment framework once again, 
holding that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate with respect to laws that 
burden the right to keep and bear arms outside of the home.145  The court, 
relying on Heller, concluded that “firearm rights have always been more 
limited” outside of the home and upheld the statute as constitutional.146 
                                                          
 137.  Id.  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id.  Content-neutral regulations serve purposes unrelated to the content of the speech.  
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).   When the government acts pursuant to 
a purpose independent of the content of the regulated speech, it lessens the probability that the 
government enacted the regulation out of disapproval with the message of the speech, the 
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality.  Id.  On the other hand, the message of the 
speech itself is the only justification for content-specific regulations.  See id. (implying that 
content-specific regulations lack independent justification because “[a] regulation that serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral . . . .”).  Based on this 
distinction, courts have applied different levels of scrutiny to the two types of regulations.  
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682; see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that a 
town’s sign code was a content-based regulation that was subject to strict scrutiny). 
 140.  Chester, 628 F.3d at 682–83.  The court vacated and remanded to afford the government 
a chance to establish a relationship between the federal statute and an important governmental 
goal.  Id. at 683.  On remand, the district court applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the 
defendant’s conviction.  United States v. Chester, 847 F. Supp. 2d 902, 911–12 (S.D.W.V. 2012). 
 141.  638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 142.  Id. at 465. 
 143.  Id. at 460. 
 144.  Id. at 465. 
 145.  Id. at 470–71. 
 146.  Id. at 470, 474. 
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In Woollard v. Gallagher,147 a handgun owner and a Second 
Amendment advocacy group challenged a Maryland law requiring its 
citizens to present a good and substantial reason for obtaining a handgun 
permit.148  In Woollard, the Fourth Circuit did not refer to its First 
Amendment-like approach during the Second Amendment analysis.149  
Citing Masciandaro, the court directly applied intermediate scrutiny to the 
challenged law because it implicated the right to keep and bear arms outside 
of the home and upheld the statute.150 
Case law within the Fourth Circuit suggests that a First Amendment 
approach is a useful analogy for analyzing Second Amendment claims.151  
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s precedent indicates a tendency to apply 
intermediate scrutiny to firearms legislation.152 
2.  Other Circuits’ Approaches and the Affinity for Intermediate 
Scrutiny 
Many state and federal courts outside of the Fourth Circuit have also 
addressed firearms legislation in the wake of Heller and McDonald.  
Several circuit courts of appeals have adopted a First Amendment-like 
approach, resembling the approach used by the Fourth Circuit, or crafted 
their own approaches.153  The most common level of scrutiny currently 
applied by courts is intermediate scrutiny.154 
Immediately following Heller and McDonald, courts applied different 
levels of scrutiny to firearms legislation.  In United States v. Engstrum,155 
for example, the District Court for the District of Utah held that a federal 
statute preventing domestic violence misdemeanants from owning a 
firearm, the same law challenged in Chester, should be analyzed under 
strict scrutiny.156  After applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the 
federal law was narrowly tailored to its legislative objective and, therefore, 
                                                          
 147.  712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 148.  Id. at 870. 
 149.  Id. (referring only to the decision in Masciandaro and not mentioning the First 
Amendment framework) 
 150.  Id. at 868, 876. 
 151.  See supra notes 137–139, 149–150 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Masciandaro, 
638 F.3d at 470 (“[A]s has been the experience under the First Amendment, we might expect that 
courts will employ different types of scrutiny in assessing burdens on Second Amendment 
rights . . . .”). 
 152.  See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (applying intermediate scrutiny); Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 
at 471 (applying intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 
2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny). 
 153.  See infra notes 168–168, 175–178 and accompanying text. 
 154.  See infra notes 169–174 and accompanying text. 
 155.  609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009). 
 156.  Id. at 1231–32; see supra note 133. 
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was presumptively lawful.157  In GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia,158 the 
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia applied intermediate 
scrutiny to a Georgia law restricting the possession of weapons in a place of 
worship and upheld the challenged law.159  The court cited a portion of 
Justice Breyer’s Heller dissent arguing that the inclusion of a list of 
presumptively lawful regulations is inconsistent with strict scrutiny.160  The 
court ultimately applied intermediate scrutiny because Georgia’s law 
concerned firearm possession outside the home.161  Still, other courts 
eschewed the traditional levels of scrutiny for standards such as an “undue 
burden” test.162 
Several circuit courts of appeals have adopted a First Amendment-like 
approach, akin to the approach used by the Fourth Circuit.  In United States 
v. Marzzarella,163 the Third Circuit held that a federal law prohibiting 
ownership of a gun with an obliterated serial number did not violate the 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.164  The court, after 
describing the procedure it used for assessing the standard of scrutiny to 
apply to First Amendment claims, announced, “[w]e see no reason why the 
Second Amendment would be any different.”165  The Court applied 
intermediate scrutiny because citizens could continue to own any lawful 
firearm if that firearm bore its original serial number.166  The Seventh 
Circuit, in Ezell v. City of Chicago,167 also borrowed from its First 
Amendment case law to determine the standard of judicial scrutiny 
applicable to Chicago’s ordinance restricting citizens’ use of firing 
ranges.168 
Today, most courts confronting firearms legislation apply intermediate 
scrutiny.169  In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo,170 the Second 
                                                          
 157.  Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
 158.  764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 2011). 
 159.  Id. at 1317–19. 
 160.  Id. at 1317 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 161.  Id. at 1317. 
 162.  See, e.g., People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th 568, 577 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(upholding a law preventing the carrying of loaded firearms in public places under a “midlevel 
standard of scrutiny analogous to the ‘undue burden’ standard”). 
 163.  614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 164.  Id. at 87. 
 165.  Id. at 96–97. 
 166.  Id. at 98–99. 
 167.  651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 168.  Id. at 702–03, 706–07. 
 169.  See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260–61 (2d Cir. 
2015).  In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, the court stated:   
[W]e conclude that intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny is appropriate. This 
conclusion coheres not only with that reached by the D.C. Circuit when considering 
substantially similar gun-control laws, but also with the analyses undertaken by other 
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Circuit Court of Appeals confronted gun-control legislation passed by the 
New York and Connecticut legislatures following the Newtown tragedy that 
closely resembled Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act of 2013.171  The court 
held that the laws’ assault weapon and large-capacity magazine bans did not 
violate the Second Amendment and noted during its level of scrutiny 
inquiry that “many” other courts conducting analyses of laws implicating 
the Second Amendment have applied intermediate scrutiny.172  The court 
cites to Marzzarella, Chester, and other recently issued opinions from the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits where intermediate scrutiny was applied to 
laws burdening the right to keep and bear arms.173  In addition, the District 
of Columbia Circuit court has applied intermediate scrutiny to similar 
legislation.174 
Despite intermediate scrutiny’s prevalence, in Friedman v. City of 
Highland Park,175 the Seventh Circuit abandoned the more traditional tiers 
of scrutiny analysis and applied a unique standard to a city ordinance 
banning assault weapons and large-capacity magazines.176  The court 
considered “whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the 
time of ratification or those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’ and whether law-
abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.”177  The Seventh 
Circuit upheld the ordinance, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.178 
                                                          
courts, many of which have applied intermediate scrutiny to laws implicating the 
Second Amendment. 
Id.; see also Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Consistent with the 
reasoning of our sister circuit, we also agree that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate [for a law 
burdening the right to keep and bear arms].”); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“[L]ike the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, we apply intermediate scrutiny to [a 
firearm statute] and hold that it is constitutional . . . .”); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 
990 F. Supp. 2d 349, 366 (W.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 804 F.3d 
242 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[C]ourts throughout the country have nearly universally applied some form 
of intermediate scrutiny in the Second Amendment context.”); United States v. Lahey, 967 F. 
Supp. 2d 731, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The emerging consensus appears to be that intermediate 
scrutiny is generally the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws which substantially burden Second 
Amendment rights.”). 
 170.  804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 171.  Id. at 247. 
 172.  Id. at 260–61. 
 173.  Id. at 261 n.101. 
 174.  Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 175.  784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015). 
 176.  Id. at 410; see also Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc 
granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem) (“[T]hat court conjured its own test . . . .”). 
 177.  Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410 (citation omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 622 (2008)). 
 178.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015), denying cert. to 784 F.3d 406 
(7th Cir. 2015). 
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The judicial landscape outside of the Fourth Circuit supports the 
application of intermediate scrutiny to firearms legislation, even when such 
legislation burdens the right to possess certain weapons within the home for 
self-defense.179  In addition, no post-Heller circuit court of appeals decision 
has applied strict scrutiny to a comprehensive firearm ban, although other 
circuits that apply a First Amendment framework have considered the 
possibility.180 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Kolbe v. Hogan, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 
district court’s decision to uphold the Firearm Safety Act, holding that a 
complete prohibition of semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines 
encroaches on the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and that 
a standard of strict constitutional scrutiny should apply to such a 
prohibition.181  First, the court reasoned that the Firearm Safety Act burdens 
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment because the assault 
weapon and large-capacity magazine bans include firearms that are 
typically used for lawful purposes and in common use.182  Second, it held 
that the district court should have applied strict scrutiny because the 
Firearm Safety Act significantly burdens the core right protected under the 
Second Amendment: use of firearms for self-defense in the home.183  
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case and instructed the 
district court to evaluate the disputed sections of the Firearm Safety Act 
under the standard of strict scrutiny.184  Additionally, the court affirmed the 
district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the State on the 
plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and vagueness claims.185 
The Fourth Circuit began with a familiar first step in the wake of 
Heller: assessing whether or not the Firearm Safety Act burdens conduct 
protected by the Second Amendment.186  Because the Firearm Safety Act 
specifically regulates weapons, Chief Judge Traxler, writing for the 
majority, considered the appropriate test for determining if possession of a 
weapon constitutes constitutionally protected conduct.187  Relying on 
                                                          
 179.  See supra notes 169–174 and accompanying text. 
 180.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d at 196 (King, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96–97 (weighing whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny). 
 181.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168 (majority opinion). 
 182.  Id. at 178. 
 183.  Id. at 181–82. 
 184.  Id. at 192. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 172 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 187.  Id. at 173 (“[W]hen the regulated conduct relates to a particular class of weapons, we 
must address an additional issue before we can say with assurance that the Second Amendment 
applies . . . .”). 
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Heller, the court stated that the Second Amendment only protects the right 
to keep and bear weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes.”188  The court referred to evidence in the record showing 
that more than eight million AR- or AK-style semi-automatic rifles were 
manufactured in or imported into the United States between 1990–2012.189  
In 2012 alone, the number of these weapons manufactured in or sold into 
the United States was twice the number of Ford F-150 trucks sold in the 
same year.190  The court also cited evidence that more than 75 million large-
capacity magazines are in circulation in the United States.191  Based on this 
evidence and other facts in the record, the court found that semi-automatic 
rifles and large-capacity magazines were both commonly possessed by law-
abiding citizens of the United States.192  The court noted that semi-
automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines were possessed for lawful 
purposes and criticized the State’s argument that semi-automatic rifles and 
large-capacity magazines had to be actually used for lawful purposes to 
warrant Second Amendment protection.193  Finally, the court asserted that 
semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines were not excluded from 
Second Amendment protection under the “dangerous and unusual” 
exception.194  The court applied the reasoning from Heller and explicitly 
rejected the State’s argument that “unusually dangerous” was synonymous 
with “dangerous and unusual.”195  In sum, the court found that semi-
automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines fall within the confines of 
Second Amendment protection.196 
The Fourth Circuit next considered which level of scrutiny to apply, 
the second step in the Heller framework.197  The court used the First 
Amendment approach from United States v. Chester.198  Under this 
approach, a court must consider “the nature of the conduct being regulated” 
and “the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.”199  The 
Fourth Circuit explained that the Firearm Safety Act prevents citizens from 
possessing banned weapons for all purposes, including the purpose of self-
                                                          
 188.  Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008)). 
 189.  Id. at 174. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. at 176. 
 194.  See id. at 177–78, 178 n.8; see infra Part IV.A (exploring the majority’s understanding of 
the “dangerous and unusual” language). 
 195.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 177–78; see infra Part IV.A (providing a more in-depth discussion of 
this point). 
 196.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 178. 
 197.  Id. at 179. 
 198.  628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 199.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 179 (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 682). 
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defense in the home.200  The court noted that this right is fundamental, so 
the conduct being regulated extends to the “core” of the Second 
Amendment.201  The court rejected the argument that the availability of 
other classes of firearms for self-defense within the home permits 
prohibiting certain classes of weapons.202  The court also pointed out that 
the Firearm Safety Act is a complete ban, so it significantly burdens this 
fundamental right.203  Based on the nature of the conduct prohibited and the 
burden imposed, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the law must be examined 
under strict scrutiny.204  In so concluding, the court rejected other standards, 
such as the Seventh Circuit’s Friedman test and intermediate scrutiny, 
applied by courts to similar assault weapon and large-capacity magazine 
bans.205  The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment 
order on the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claims and remanded for the 
district court to apply strict scrutiny.206 
Next, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ claim that the Firearm Safety 
Act’s exception, which allowed former law enforcement officers to possess 
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.207  Although the plaintiffs 
argued that they were similarly situated to retired law enforcement officers 
in all relevant respects, the Fourth Circuit highlighted several fundamental 
differences between the two groups.208  Because an Equal Protection claim 
                                                          
 200.  Id. at 179–80. 
 201.  Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (explaining that the 
interest-balancing approach is particularly inappropriate because the core of the constitutional 
right under the Second Amendment is at stake)). 
 202.  Id. at 180–81 (“[T]he fact that handguns, bolt-action and other manually-loaded long 
guns, and, as noted earlier, a few semi-automatic rifles are still available for self-defense does not 
mitigate this burden . . . .”); cf. id. at 181 (“[O]ne is not to have the exercise of liberty of 
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other 
place.” (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975))). 
 203.  See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 180 (“The burden imposed in this case is not merely 
incidental. . . . [The Firearm Safety Act] reaches every instance where an AR-15 platform semi-
automatic rifle or LCM might be preferable to handguns or bolt-action rifles . . . .”). 
 204.  Id. at 181–82. 
 205.  See id. at 182 (“We recognize that other courts have reached different outcomes when 
assessing similar bans, but we ultimately find those decisions unconvincing.”). 
 206.  Id. at 192. 
 207.  Id. at 184–85.  Judge Agee wrote this section of the majority opinion, with Judge King 
concurring in the judgment and Chief Judge Traxler dissenting.  See id. at 184, 199. 
 208.  Id. at 185–88.  These fundamental differences included the training and experience with 
firearms that former police officers have, the public trust granted to police officers, and the threats 
from criminals that former police officers face.  Id.  The court also determined that these 
differences between retired law enforcement officers and private citizens were sufficiently related 
to the objectives of the Firearm Safety Act.  Id. at 188–89 (explaining that the retired law 
enforcement officer exception is “directly related to [the Maryland legislature’s] broad objectives” 
and the court “should not embrace” the argument made by Chief Judge Traxler’s  dissent that the 
differences between retired law enforcement officers and private citizens are not related to these 
objectives). 
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requires two groups that are similarly situated yet treated differently, the 
court affirmed the district court’s ruling.209 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the plaintiffs’ claim that the 
Firearm Safety Act is void for vagueness because the law uses the 
undefined term “copies.”210  The court affirmed the district court and held 
that the Firearm Safety Act is not void for vagueness because the act has a 
plainly legitimate sweep that identifies a core of prohibited conduct such 
that the ordinary citizen could understand it.211 
Judge King concurred in the judgment on the plaintiffs’ equal 
protection and vagueness claims, but strongly dissented from the majority’s 
conclusion that the district court should have reviewed the Firearm Safety 
Act under strict scrutiny.212  He argued that the Second Amendment should 
not protect semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines because 
these firearms are “lethal weapons of war,” nearly indistinguishable from 
some firearms singled out in Heller as “dangerous and unusual.”213  Judge 
King disagreed with the majority’s conception of the “dangerous and 
unusual” standard, specifically its reliance on the ambiguous word 
“common”214 and its perfunctory treatment of the word “dangerous.”215  
Although inclined to find that the Firearm Safety Act does not infringe on 
Second Amendment rights, Judge King resisted doing so and proceeded to a 
means-end scrutiny analysis.216  Judge King argued that the majority erred 
by mandating that strict scrutiny apply to the Firearm Safety Act, because 
intermediate scrutiny was counseled by the Fourth Circuit’s own 
precedent,217 the decisions of sister circuits,218 and the degree to which the 
                                                          
 209.  Id. at 189–90. 
 210.  Id. at 190; see generally MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-101(r)(2) (West Supp. 2015) 
(classifying “a firearm that is any one of the following specific assault weapons or their copies” as 
regulated firearms).  Once again, Chief Judge Traxler wrote for the majority.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 
190. 
 211.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 192.  In its analysis, the court explained that due process requires 
criminal statutes to adequately inform citizens of ordinary intelligence about what type of conduct 
is illegal, and if a criminal statute cannot be understood by the ordinary citizen, it should be held 
void for vagueness.  Id. at 190 (citing United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)).  
The court tempered this observation and stated that vagueness challenges are deferential and 
unlikely to succeed if a statute has “a plainly legitimate sweep.”  Id. at 190–91 (quoting United 
States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 212.  Id. at 192 (King, J., dissenting). 
 213.  Id. at 193 (comparing an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle to a previously banned M-16 rifle). 
 214.  Id. at 194 (“what line separates ‘common’ from ‘uncommon’ ownership” (quoting 
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 
(2015))).  
 215.  Id. at 195 (“Another significant problem with the panel majority’s conception of the 
dangerous-and-unusual standard is that it renders the word ‘dangerous’ superfluous, on the 
premise that all firearms are dangerous.”). 
 216.  Id. at 196. 
 217.  Id. at 197 (first citing Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); and then 
citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
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law burdened the right to keep and bear arms.219  Therefore, Judge King 
concluded that, were he the district judge, he would apply intermediate 
scrutiny and uphold the Firearm Safety Act as constitutional.220 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Kolbe v. Hogan, the Fourth Circuit held that the Second 
Amendment protects semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines 
and that Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.221  The court made the correct judgment in this case, both because 
it accurately construed Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” language, and 
because it properly determined that Maryland’s comprehensive assault 
weapon and large-capacity magazine ban should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.222  The Fourth Circuit refuted several misconceptions concerning 
the “dangerous and unusual” language in Heller, including the way the 
language functions and its importance within the context of a judicial 
analysis.223  Furthermore, the court sensibly concluded that the district court 
should examine Maryland’s assault weapon and large-capacity magazine 
bans under the strictest level of scrutiny.224  The Fourth Circuit advanced an 
important argument in favor of applying strict scrutiny that other courts 
must consider when faced with Second Amendment challenges to similar 
legislation and may represent a shift in the tide of Second Amendment case 
law.225  The Fourth Circuit’s decision may also persuade the Supreme Court 
to address the circuit split regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny for 
assault weapon bans.226  In addition, it requires state legislatures within the 
circuit to pass more narrowly tailored firearms legislation.227 
A.  The Fourth Circuit’s Judgment Reaffirmed the Proper 
Interpretation of “Dangerous and Unusual” 
In Kolbe, the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that semi-automatic 
rifles and large-capacity magazines are typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes and, therefore, are protected under the Second 
                                                          
 218.  Id. at 196 (“[N]ot a single court of appeals has ever—until now—deemed strict scrutiny 
to be applicable to a firearms regulation along the lines of the [Firearm Safety Act].”). 
 219.  See id. at 197 (holding that the Firearm Safety Act does not sufficiently inhibit the right 
to keep and bear arms to warrant strict scrutiny). 
 220.  See id. at 198. 
 221.  Id. at 178, 182 (majority opinion). 
 222.  See infra Part IV.A, Part IV.B. 
 223.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 224.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168. 
 225.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 226.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 227.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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Amendment.228  In doing so, the court clarified several misconceptions held 
by the State, the dissent, and recent decisions from other courts concerning 
Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” language.229  Kolbe emphasized that 
“dangerous and unusual” is not synonymous with “unusually dangerous,” 
the “dangerous and unusual” language is not an independent limitation on 
the right to keep and bear arms, and the “in common use at the time” 
language has not been supplanted by the “dangerous and unusual” 
language.230 
1.  “Unusually Dangerous” is Not Synonymous with “Dangerous 
and Unusual” 
In Kolbe, the court faithfully adhered to the Supreme Court’s 
“dangerous and unusual” language and rejected an alteration advanced by 
the State and the dissent.  In Heller, the “dangerous and unusual” language 
first appears when the Court discusses the appropriate limits on the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.231  The Heller Court adopts a 
limitation from United States v. Miller confining Second Amendment 
protection to weapons “in common use at the time.”232  The Court explained 
that this limitation is supported by the established practice of proscribing 
the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.233  In Kolbe, the State 
argued that “unusually dangerous” weapons fall outside the scope of 
Second Amendment protection.234  Judge King, in his dissent, supported the 
State’s use of the “unusually dangerous” benchmark by claiming that the 
standard found support in Heller.235  The Fourth Circuit rightly refuted 
these arguments.  First, the court could not locate a single statute or case 
mentioning the “unusually dangerous” standard, so it was unsupported by 
legal precedent.236  Additionally, the State inappropriately rearranged 
“dangerous and unusual,” two words that Heller Court purposefully 
arranged conjunctively.237  Furthermore, substituting “unusually dangerous” 
in place of “dangerous and unusual” would yield significant consequences 
                                                          
 228.  See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168 (announcing that semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity 
magazines were within Second Amendment protection). 
 229.  See, e.g., id. at 178 (concluding that the State’s unusually dangerous standard “is of no 
avail”); see also infra Part IV.A.1–3 (explaining why other views of the “dangerous and unusual” 
language are erroneous).  But see Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 195 (King, J., dissenting) (“[T]he unusually 
dangerous benchmark is no more difficult to apply than, for example, the majority’s dubious 
test . . . .”). 
 230.  See infra Parts IV.A–B 
 231.  554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). 
 232.  Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 177 (majority opinion). 
 235.  Id. at 195 (King, J., dissenting). 
 236.  Id. at 177 (majority opinion). 
 237.  Id. at 178 (emphasis added). 
TurlingtonFinalBookProof 1/19/2017  3:59 PM 
512 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:487 
that the Supreme Court did not intend.238  Whereas Heller’s arrangement 
suggests that even a dangerous weapon may enjoy constitutional protection 
if that weapon is in common use at the time, the State’s arrangement 
forecloses this possibility entirely.239  It is also unclear which weapons are 
so dangerous that they do not receive Second Amendment protection.240  
Kolbe’s rejection of the “unusually dangerous” standard prevented the 
manipulation of the “dangerous and unusual” language from Heller. 
2.  “Dangerous and Unusual” Does Not Function as an 
Independent Limitation on the Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
The Kolbe court also correctly noted that the “dangerous and unusual” 
language from Heller does not independently constrain the right to keep and 
bear arms.241  In Kolbe, both the State and the dissent viewed “dangerous 
and unusual” as an independent limitation on the right to keep and bear 
arms.242  The State claimed that firearms that are “unusually dangerous” fall 
altogether outside of the scope of the Second Amendment.243  Judge King 
wrote in his dissent, “I am far from convinced that the Second Amendment 
reaches the AR-15 and other assault weapons prohibited under Maryland 
law, given their military-style features, particular dangerousness, and 
questionable utility for self-defense.”244  Judge King later asserted that “the 
Heller Court surely had relative dangerousness in mind when it repudiated 
Second Amendment protection for short-barreled shotguns and ‘weapons 
that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like.’”245  
Thus, Judge King would presumptively rely on the AR-15’s dangerousness 
as a factor in withdrawing Second Amendment protection from such a 
weapon.246  Other courts have understood Heller’s dangerous and unusual 
                                                          
 238.  See id. at 177 (noting that Heller’s standard would sometimes protect dangerous weapons 
that were “widely employed for lawful purposes”). 
 239.  Id. at 177–78 (“But if the proper judicial standard is to go by total murders committed, 
then handguns should be considered far more dangerous . . . .  Yet Heller has established that 
handguns are constitutionally protected . . . .”); see also, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 
784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) (referring to statistics that reveal 
handguns kill as many people in Chicago annually as mass shootings have killed nationwide in the 
past decade). 
 240.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 177–78. 
 241.  See id. at 177 (“The State’s novel ‘unusually dangerous’ standard reads too much into 
Heller.”). 
 242.  The State attempted to exclude the challenged weapons on the grounds that they were 
dangerous and unusual.  Id.  Judge King repeatedly refers to the “dangerous-and-unusual” 
standard in his analysis.  Id. at 194–96 (King, J., dissenting). 
 243.  Id. at 177 (majority opinion). 
 244.  Id. at 193 (King, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 245.  Id. at 195 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008)). 
 246.  See id. at 196 (stating that he is “strongly inclined” to declare that the Firearm Safety Act 
does not implicate the Second Amendment).  In his opinion, Judge King actually refrained from 
reaching this conclusion in order to apply an appropriate level of scrutiny.  Id. 
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language in a similar light.  In Commonwealth v. Caetano,247 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a Massachusetts law prohibiting 
the possession of stun guns did not violate the Second Amendment.248  The 
court used a dangerous and unusual test to analyze whether stun guns were 
dangerous per se, which it defined as “designed and constructed to produce 
death or great bodily harm . . . for the purpose of bodily assault or 
defense,”249 and whether stun guns were unusual, which it defined as “a 
weapon of warfare to be used by the militia.”250 
As the majority stated in Kolbe, and as the Supreme Court confirmed 
in vacating Commonwealth v. Caetano, the Court did not intend its phrase 
“dangerous and unusual” to function as an independent limitation on an 
individual Second Amendment right.251  Heller’s baseline protection under 
the Second Amendment was an individual right, unconnected to military 
service, to keep and bear arms in case of confrontation.252  The Supreme 
Court articulated two limitations on what type of weapons command 
Second Amendment protection: those which are “typically possessed by 
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”253 and weapons “in common use 
at the time.”254  The Heller Court went on to note that the “common use” 
limitation “is fairly supported” by the practice of prohibiting “dangerous 
and unusual weapons.”255  To infer the meaning the State does from this 
language, the Supreme Court must have used the active tense.256  For 
example, if the Heller Court had announced, “the common use limitation 
fairly supports the tradition of banning dangerous and unusual weapons” 
the phrasing would indicate that the “common use” analysis was a way of 
answering a “dangerous and unusual” inquiry.257  This is not the case.258  As 
                                                          
 247.  26 N.E.3d 688 (Mass. 2015), vacated per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016). 
 248.  Id. at 695. 
 249.  Id. at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 1980)). 
 250.  Id. at 693. 
 251.  See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam). 
 252.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008); see also Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 
F.3d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem). 
 253.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 173 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625).  Heller offers the example of a 
short-barreled shotgun as a weapon that fails this particular test.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (citing 
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)). 
 254.  Id. at 172 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627). 
 255.  554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 256.  Cf. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 178 (referring to Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Heller, 
which focused on dangerousness alone, and indicating that Justice Breyer potentially construed 
the “dangerous and unusual” and “common use” relationship in a different manner than the 
majority in Heller intended). 
 257.  See, e.g., id. (“Most likely, common use is the sole limiting principle.” (quoting Dan 
Terzian, The Right to Bear (Robotic) Arms, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 755, 767–68 (2013))). 
 258.  Other examples may prove instructive.  Consider “the verdict is fairly supported by the 
evidence” and “the writer’s conclusion is fairly supported by her arguments.”  Both of these 
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Kolbe emphasized, “it was only a dissent in Heller” that used this line of 
reasoning.259  Typical possession by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes and common use at the time are the only constitutional hurdles a 
particular weapon must clear in order to gain eligibility for Second 
Amendment protection.  Therefore, assertions like Judge King’s, that 
dangerousness led the Heller Court to ban M-16 rifles, are misleading.  The 
Heller Court banned M-16 rifles because the rifles were not in common use 
at the time, and by extension “unusual,” not because those weapons reached 
a certain level of dangerousness.260  In Caetano v. Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Court reinforced this view and criticized the Massachusetts court’s 
understanding of the “dangerous and unusual” language.261  In his 
concurrence, Justice Alito wrote, “If Heller tells us anything, it is that 
firearms cannot be categorically prohibited just because they are 
dangerous.”262 
In summary, the court in Kolbe recognized that Heller used 
“dangerous and unusual” to describe the types of weapons that might not 
receive Second Amendment protection, but Heller did not intend 
“dangerous and unusual” to independently constrain the right to keep and 
bear arms. 
3.  “In Common Use at the Time” Is Still Relevant to the 
Consideration of a Second Amendment Claim 
Lastly, Kolbe recognized that the “dangerous and unusual” language 
has not supplanted the “in common use at the time” limitation from Heller.  
The dissent and Friedman criticize the “in common use at the time” 
limitation and its continued relevance.  In Friedman, the Seventh Circuit 
upheld a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines while 
dismissing interpretations of Heller that rely on the common use 
limitation.263  The court wrote: 
[R]elying on how common a weapon is at the time of litigation 
would be circular to boot.  Machine guns aren’t commonly owned 
for lawful purposes today because they are illegal; semi-
automatic weapons with large-capacity magazines are owned 
more commonly because, until recently (in some jurisdictions), 
                                                          
sentences involve similar relationships and should illustrate the importance of the tense the Heller 
Court used. 
 259.  Id. at 178. 
 260.  Id. at 177. 
 261.  136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016) (per curiam). 
 262.  Id. at 1028 (Alito, J., concurring).  But see id. at 1131 (suggesting that “dangerous and 
unusual” is a conjunctive test). 
 263.  Friedman v. Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
447 (2015). 
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they have been legal.  Yet it would be absurd to say that the 
reason why a particular weapon can be banned is that there is a 
statute banning it, so that it isn’t commonly owned.  A law’s 
existence can’t be the source of its own constitutional validity.264 
The dissent in Kolbe quoted this passage as support for the idea that 
the majority misunderstood the word “unusual” as it functions within 
Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” standard.265  While the majority defined 
unusual in terms of whether a weapon is in common use or typically 
possessed by the citizenry, the dissent contends that unusual cannot mean 
not commonly possessed, because this would result in imaginary line-
drawing, whereby a weapon’s popularity determines its constitutionality.266 
Although this language may seem circular or absurd to some, the 
majority in Kolbe did not misunderstand the “in common use at the time” 
limitation or how the Supreme Court intended the word “unusual” to 
function.  In an order denying certiorari to the Friedman case, Justice 
Thomas—joined by Justice Scalia who wrote the Heller opinion—
explained that the Seventh Circuit misread Heller and “flout[ed] two of [the 
Court’s] Second Amendment precedents.”267  In other words, the Friedman 
court erred because “[u]nder [the Court’s] precedents, [common use for 
lawful purposes] is all that is needed for citizens to have a right under the 
Second Amendment to keep such weapons.”268  The Kolbe court reiterated 
the idea that common use or typical possession by the citizenry is the 
hallmark of Second Amendment protection, not the “dangerous and 
unusual” quality of the weapons alone.269  And, in Caetano, the Court 
reaffirmed the importance of the common use at the time limitation and the 
“dangerous and unusual” language.270  In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Alito writes, “the pertinent Second Amendment inquiry is whether stun 
guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes 
today.”271  Justice Alito also explored the Massachusetts state court’s 
misapplication of the “dangerous and unusual” language and explained that 
the court “defied Heller’s reasoning.”272 
                                                          
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. 
App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem). 
 266.  Id. at 177; id. at 194–95 (King, J., dissenting). 
 267.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting), denying 
cert. to 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 177–78. 
 270.  See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 271.  Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1032 (2016) (per curiam) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 272.  Id. at 1030. 
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Despite these alternative views, Kolbe hewed closest to the language 
set forth in Heller.273  Future courts considering Second Amendment 
challenges to firearms legislation should rely on Kolbe, not Friedman or 
others, because Kolbe construed “dangerous and unusual” as the Supreme 
Court intended. 
B.  The Fourth Circuit Correctly Mandated Strict Scrutiny, 
Encouraging the Supreme Court to Resolve the Circuit Split and 
Legislatures to Narrowly Tailor Future Firearms Legislation 
In Kolbe, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that the Firearm Safety 
Act’s assault weapon and large-capacity magazine bans should be analyzed 
under strict scrutiny.274  The court grounded its determination in the “First-
Amendment-like” framework that the Fourth Circuit often employs for 
challenges under the Second Amendment.275  Since the Firearm Safety Act 
indiscriminately banned a class of firearms used for conduct at the core of 
the Second Amendment, the court equated the law with one that 
“foreclose[s] an entire medium of expression” in a First Amendment 
context.276  Legislation that severely burdens a fundamental right must be 
analyzed under strict scrutiny.277  Although the State argued that the 
plaintiffs could possess other types of weapons to defend themselves, Kolbe 
reinforced that courts cannot permit bans of entire classes of weapons 
merely because other classes of weapons are available.278  The Fourth 
Circuit’s holding appreciated that “the enshrinement of constitutional rights 
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”279  The Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms, just like the First Amendment 
right to free speech, commands the judiciary’s protection.  If courts subject 
content-based speech regulations to strict scrutiny because those regulations 
intrude upon the core First Amendment right, then blanket firearm bans that 
intrude upon the core Second Amendment right, the law-abiding citizen’s 
right to possess a firearm for self-defense, should also be subject to strict 
scrutiny.280 
                                                          
 273.  See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 194–95 (showing deference to key passages from Heller such as 
“typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” and the conjunctive phrase 
“dangerous and unusual” and applying those passages in the same way the Court did in Heller). 
 274.  Id. at 182. 
 275.  Id. at 179 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 276.  Id. at 183 (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994)); see, e.g., Jamison v. 
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414, 416 (1943) (holding that the First Amendment protects the door-to-door 
distribution of literature from prohibition “at all times, at all places, and under all circumstances”). 
 277.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 181. 
 278.  Id. at 180–81. 
 279.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008). 
 280.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (requiring strict scrutiny for a 
town’s sign code that targeted speech based on its content). 
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Kolbe was the first court of appeals to apply strict scrutiny to a 
comprehensive assault weapon and large-capacity magazine ban.281  The 
court acknowledged that other courts have applied intermediate scrutiny to 
similar bans.282  In Friedman, the Seventh Circuit applied its own standard, 
which the Kolbe court strongly criticized.283  A few courts have applied 
strict scrutiny to other firearm regulations or in non-Second Amendment 
cases,284 but intermediate scrutiny is the overwhelming standard of 
choice.285  Many courts echo the sentiment “strict in theory, but fatal in 
fact,” which implies that applying strict scrutiny will inevitably overturn the 
law in question.286  But, as Justice O’Connor explained in Adarand 
Constructors v. Pena,287 strict scrutiny is not, in fact, fatal.288  Rather, it is 
designed to ensure that the legislature acts “within constitutional 
constraints” by narrowly tailoring its means toward a compelling 
governmental end.289 
As the first court of appeals decision to conclude that strict scrutiny 
should be applied to a provision of comprehensive firearms legislation, 
Kolbe may influence Second Amendment jurisprudence outside of the 
Fourth Circuit and gun regulations within the Fourth Circuit.  First, courts 
that have not yet addressed cases involving broad firearms legislation will 
have to consider Kolbe’s strong endorsement of strict scrutiny when 
analyzing similar bans.  Heller left the appropriate level of heightened 
scrutiny for firearms legislation open to interpretation by the lower 
courts.290  Circuit courts of appeals have been reluctant to apply strict 
                                                          
 281.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 196 (King, J., dissenting). 
 282.  Id. at 182; see, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261–62 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that 
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny is the appropriate heightened standard of review 
for a comprehensive firearm statute). 
 283.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 182 (majority opinion). 
 284.  See, e.g., United States v. Montalvo, No. 08-CR-004S, 2009 WL 595998, at *3 
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556 (LEK), 2008 WL 4534058, 
at *5–6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008). 
 285.  Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 
MD. L. REV. 1131, 1145 (2011). 
 286.  See e.g., Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 198 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)). 
 287.  515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 288.  Id. at 237. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (referring generally to the fact that the law would satisfy “any” 
of the standards of heightened scrutiny); cf. Richard C. Boldt, Decisional Minimalism and the 
Judicial Evaluation of Gun Regulations, 71 MD. L. REV. 1177, 1178–82 (2012) (asserting that 
Justice Scalia adopted a Burkean minimalist approach in the Heller opinion and left the 
appropriate standard of scrutiny question open for judges to interpret based on “longstanding 
settled practices and traditions”). 
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scrutiny and have generally opted to apply intermediate scrutiny.291  
Intermediate scrutiny permits courts to show greater deference to the 
legislature than strict scrutiny in the process of upholding most firearms 
legislation.292  Similarly, many courts have displayed a tendency to confine 
Heller to its specific facts, which limits its application to handgun bans.293  
Yet many of the same courts that apply intermediate scrutiny to firearm 
regulations or cabin Heller’s holding to handgun bans subject laws that 
infringe upon other enumerated constitutional rights to strict scrutiny.294  
Kolbe is not mandatory authority outside of the Fourth Circuit, but it is 
persuasive authority.  In at least one case, lawyers filing Second 
Amendment claims in the Tenth Circuit have already cited Kolbe in order to 
persuade the court to apply strict scrutiny.295  Furthermore, Kolbe 
challenges Friedman, a case that some viewed as the future direction of 
Second Amendment jurisprudence.296  Friedman asked whether a firearm 
regulation “bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or 
those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well regulated [sic] militia’ . . . and whether law-abiding 
citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.”297  Kolbe discussed some of 
                                                          
 291.  See Kiehl, supra note 285, at 1145 (“The majority of courts to announce a standard of 
review have employed intermediate scrutiny, which is emerging as a clear favorite in the lower 
courts for Second Amendment challenges.”); supra notes 174–174 and accompanying text. 
 292.  See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260–61, 269 (2d Cir. 
2015) (applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding an assault weapon ban); Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1247, 1257 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (same); see also Kiehl, supra note 285, at 1142 (“[T]he only consistency in the 
lower court cases is in the results.  Regardless of the test used, challenged gun laws almost always 
survive.” (quoting TINA MEHR & ADAM WINKLER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, THE 
STANDARDLESS SECOND AMENDMENT 1 (2010), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files 
/Mehr_and_Winkler_Standardless_Second_Amendment.pdf)). 
 293.  See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting), denying cert. to 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Instead of adhering to our reasoning in 
Heller, the Seventh Circuit limited Heller to its facts . . . .”); see also Richard Re, Narrowing 
Supreme Court Precedent From Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 962 (2016) (stating that some courts’ 
reasonable reluctance to apply the ruling in Heller led Justice Thomas to write dissents from 
denials of certiorari criticizing this “apparent narrowing from below”). 
 294.  See, e.g., State Emp. Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 718 F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir. 
2013) (holding that a state policy of only laying off union members interfered with the employees’ 
freedom to associate and was subject to strict scrutiny). 
 295.  See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 10–11, Bonidy v. United States Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 
1121 (10th Cir.) (No. 15-746), 2016 WL 722179 (arguing that the court should consider Kolbe 
and apply strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (mem). 
 296.  See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the 
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1201–04 (2015) (citing 
Friedman in support of the idea that the more “flexible” approach taken by lower courts has 
doomed Heller’s reading of Second Amendment originalism and opened the door to an interest-
balancing approach). 
 297.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
447 (2015) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622–25 (2008); and then citing 
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939)). 
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the flaws in this standard of scrutiny that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas 
identified in their dissent from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari for 
Friedman.298  Specifically, Kolbe dismissed the Seventh Circuit’s approach 
because it ignores the levels of scrutiny analysis in a way that “cannot be 
reconciled with Heller.”299  Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in the Friedman case, the Court endorsed Kolbe’s view in the more recent 
Caetano case by criticizing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 
decision to ban stun guns, labelling it incompatible with Heller’s extension 
of Second Amendment protection to arms that were not in existence at the 
time of the founding.300  Thus, other courts must seriously consider Kolbe 
and its arguments when determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to 
apply to sweeping firearms legislation. 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Kolbe will produce firearms 
legislation that offers greater protection to the right to keep and bear arms.  
Kolbe has influenced Second Amendment jurisprudence by creating a 
circuit split301 regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny for a Second 
Amendment analysis, which may compel the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari to a case involving a firearm ban.302  All circuit courts of appeals 
up until Kolbe addressing challenges to comprehensive firearms legislation 
applied intermediate scrutiny.303  In late 2015, before Kolbe was decided, 
the Supreme Court declined to expound on the scrutiny question it left open 
in Heller by denying certiorari in the Friedman case.304  Following Kolbe, 
legal commentators and news articles have predicted that the Supreme 
Court will grant certiorari to a case involving comprehensive firearms 
legislation in order to rectify the circuit split.305 
                                                          
 298.  Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. 
App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem) (majority opinion). 
 299.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 182. 
 300.  136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (per curiam) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (“[The 
Massachusetts stun gun ban is] inconsistent with Heller’s clear statement that the Second 
Amendment ‘extends . . . to . . . arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of the 
founding.’”)). 
 301.  Compare N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260–61 (2d Cir. 
2015) (applying intermediate scrutiny to an assault weapon ban), and Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410 
(applying a standard requiring protected weapons to have a reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia to an assault weapon ban), with Kolbe, 813 
F.3d at 182 (applying strict scrutiny to an assault weapon ban). 
 302.  See, e.g., Eric Hansford, Measuring The Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split 
Reviews, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1152–53 (explaining that the Supreme Court typically takes 
cases from the courts of appeals to settle a disagreement among the circuits). 
 303.  Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 196 (King, J., dissenting). 
 304.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 447 (2015), denying cert. to 784 F.3d 
406 (7th Cir. 2015) 
 305.  See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Are Assault Weapons Protected by the Second Amendment?, 
SLATE (Feb. 5, 2016, 3:14 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/the_supreme_court_may_
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Now may be a particularly opportune time for the Supreme Court to 
decide what level of scrutiny should be applied in Second Amendment 
challenges.  Gun control legislation played a prominent role in the national 
political conversation during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.306  Cities 
and states will likely continue to pass, or at least propose, assault weapon 
bans in light of recent, high profile shootings, often committed with 
automatic or semi-automatic weapons.307  Assuming that the Supreme Court 
does not pull back from Heller, where the Court insisted that the Second 
Amendment legislation must satisfy heightened scrutiny, it might 
specifically endorse either intermediate or strict scrutiny.308  If the Court 
champions strict scrutiny, then the fundamental, constitutional right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense will be accorded greater protection by all 
courts. 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court and 
instructed the court to apply strict scrutiny in order to decide whether or not 
the Firearm Safety Act is constitutional.309  On remand, the district court 
could conclude that the Firearm Safety Act, when examined through a lens 
of strict scrutiny, violates the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms.  If the district court does hold the act unconstitutional, Maryland and 
the other states within the Fourth Circuit will have to change their approach 
                                                          
finally_have_to_take_a_new_gun_case.html (considering the idea that we may see a “high court 
showdown” involving the Supreme Court and comprehensive gun legislation following Kolbe). 
 306.  See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The Final Trump-Clinton Debate Transcript, Annotated, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/19/the-final-
trump-clinton-debate-transcript-annotated/ (transcribing the third, televised debate between 
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign, during which the 
candidates discussed, among other topics, gun regulation and comprehensive background checks). 
 307.  In particular, the tragic shooting in an Orlando nightclub on June 12, 2016, provoked a 
groundswell of support for assault weapon bans.  See Christopher Ingraham, Support for Assault 
Weapons Ban Surges Following Orlando Shooting, WASH. POST (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/15/something-might-be-changing-after-
orlando-americans-suddenly-want-to-ban-assault-weapons/ (describing the rise in the number of 
Americans who support a nationwide assault weapon ban following the shooting in the Pulse 
nightclub); Gary Rohrer, GOP, Democrats Still Battle over Gun Control in Florida, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (June 17, 2016, 5:55 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulse-orlando-
nightclub-shooting/politics/os-orlando-shooting-gun-control-legislature-20160617-story.html 
(describing the debate over increased gun control in the Florida legislature following the Orlando 
shooting).  The Orlando shooter used a semi-automatic pistol and semi-automatic rifle to kill 
forty-nine people and injure fifty-three more, marking the deadliest mass shooting in American 
history.  Hayley Tsukayama, Mark Berman & Jerry Markon, Gunman Who Killed 49 in Orlando 
Nightclub Had Pledged Allegiance to ISIS, WASH. POST (June 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/06/12/orlando-nightclub-shooting-
about-20-dead-in-domestic-terror-incident-at-gay-club/. 
 308.  Strict scrutiny is one of the types of heightened scrutiny that the Court permitted lower 
courts to apply following Heller and McDonald.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 628 (2008) (disqualifying rational-basis scrutiny only). 
 309.  Id. at 168.  But see supra note 13 (explaining that the Fourth Circuit must issue an en 
banc opinion first that could prevent the case from being remanded). 
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to firearms legislation.310  Presumably, future gun regulations will need to 
be narrower to allow law-abiding citizens to possess firearms, including 
semi-automatic weapons, within their homes for the purpose of self-
defense.311 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In Kolbe v. Hogan, the Fourth Circuit held that semi-automatic rifles 
and large-capacity magazines were protected under the Second Amendment 
and that a total prohibition of these weapons should be analyzed under strict 
scrutiny.312  The court reached the correct conclusion in this case, partly 
because its accurate interpretation of the “dangerous and unusual” standard 
set forth in Heller should assist future courts facing Second Amendment 
challenges.313  Furthermore, the court properly decided Kolbe because it 
determined that comprehensive assault weapon and large-capacity 
magazine bans like the Firearm Safety Act’s must be evaluated under the 
standard of strict scrutiny.314  The Fourth Circuit’s application of strict 
scrutiny implores future courts to seriously consider Kolbe’s arguments for 
strict scrutiny in the context of broad firearms legislation and could pressure 
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a similar Second Amendment 
challenge in the next few years.315  In addition, if on remand the district 
court finds the Firearm Safety Act unconstitutional, state legislatures within 
the Fourth Circuit will need to pass narrower firearm regulations that 
safeguard the right to keep and bear arms.316 
                                                          
 310.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 922–23, 927 (2010) (Breyer J., 
dissenting) (asserting that state legislatures must consider firearm case law when devising gun 
regulations). 
 311.  See Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 183 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. 
App’x. 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem) (noting that the Firearm Safety Act goes beyond regulation into 
total prohibition and implying that Maryland’s legislature should have tempered this absolute 
prohibition).  
 312.  Id. at 168. 
 313.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 314.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 315.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 316.  See supra Part IV.B. 
